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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beer trademarks have become perhaps the most contentious of 
battlegrounds in an industry that built itself on a community of 
collaboration and camaraderie. The growing pains are understandable, 
however. The United States has witnessed a record number of craft 
breweries in recent years and the numbers only continue to rise. 
According to the Brewers Association, a not-for-profit trade 
association dedicated to small and independent American beer, as of 
November 2015, the country boasted a historic high of 4,144 
breweries. 2 In terms oftrademark competition, that is not merely 4,144 
1 Stacy Allura Hostetter started her legal career in the craft beer industry with 
all their transactional needs including intellectual property, contracts, licensing, 
business law, and regulatory compliance. Stacy co-authored Brew Law 101: A Guide 
to Opening a Brewery in 2015 and has presented at local, state, and national 
conferences with regards to the legal challenges faced by small businesses in highly 
regulated industries on topics ranging from trademark disputes to distribution 
relationships. Stacy now proudly serves the California cannabis industry at the Law 
Offices of Omar Figueroa with similar matters. 
2 Press Release, Brewers Association, The Year in Beer: U.S. Brewery Count 
Reaches All-Time High of 4,144 (Dec. 2, 2015), 
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brewery names that need to be avoided if you are thinking ofjoining 
the sudsy ranks, but another ten individual beer names per brewery at 
least - and many breweries have much deeper portfolios than that. 
Puns seemed to be the first casualties in the war of words as breweries 
swept up every conceivable beer and hop pun imaginable.3 But even 
as the beer-themed linguistic well ran dry for puns, brewers discovered 
that less beer-specific names had issues as well. The crux of the issue 
is that beer and other alcoholic beverages are all treated as "related 
goods" for trademark purposes. This is so despite beer existing in a 
different international class than other alcoholic beverages in the 
trademark classification system used around the globe (beer belongs to 
International Class 32, while wine, spirits, and every other form of 
alcoholic beverage belongs to International Class 33).4 Thus, when 
analyzing a potential mark, brewers must take into account not only 
the ever-increasing number of craft breweries and their ever-
lengthening beer lists, but also wineries, distilleries, kombucha 
manufacturers, sake manufacturers, and so forth. 
By way of reference, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office currently shows 27,303 live applications and registrations for 
trademarks in International Class 32 in connection with beer products 
and no less than 62,746 live applications and registrations in 
International Class 33 for other alcoholic beverages.' But even those 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/the-year-in-beer-u-s-brewery-
count-reaches-all-time-high-of-4144/. 
Simon Berger, Craft Breweries areRunning Out ofPun Names for Beers, 
Resort to Suing Each Other Instead, THE ROOSTER (July 26, 2016), 
http://www.therooster.com/blog/craft-breweries-run-out-pun-names-beers-resort-
suing-each-other; Sara Randazzo, As Hop Puns Run Dry, Craft Beer Trademark 
Litigation Heats Up, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 11, 2016, 11:57 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/07/11/as-hop-puns-run-dry-craft-beer-trademark-
litigation-heats-up/; Alastair Bland, CraftBrewers are Running Out of Names and 
Into Legal Spats, NPR: THE SALT (Jan. 5, 2015, 9:08 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/ 
01/05/369445171 /craft-brewers-are-running-out-of-names-and-into-legal-spats; 
Andy Crouch, The Great Beer Trademark Wars: Brewers Head to the Courts to 
Protect Their Brands, ALL ABOUT BEER MAG., April 30, 2014, 
http://allaboutbeer.com/article/beer-trademarks/. 
4 World Intellectual Prop. Org., International Classification of Goods and 
Services for the Purposes of Registration ofMarks (10th ed. 2011). 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, TESS (Aug. 1, 2016). First 
search: (032)[IC], (beer)[GS], and (live)[LD]. Second search: (033)[IC] and 
(live)[LD]. 
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numbers barely paint the picture. Consumer-driven beer tracking 
website Beeradvocate currently has over 300,000 beer brands in its 
database alone.6 While the industry may have started with a team effort 
attitude rooted in opposition to the handful of mega-breweries that 
consolidated market share, the trademark drought has led even craft 
breweries to legal spats and litigation in recent years.' So with ever-
increasing competition and so many monikers already claimed, it is no 
wonder that a distinct trademark is worth a premium. But where to 
turn? 
One category of marks that is relatively untapped is the immoral, 
indecent, and obscene. The landscape of the moral low-brow has seen 
little action to date, though likely not for lack of desire. Rather, legal 
barriers have prevented brewers and other alcohol manufacturers from 
such marks. Until recently, just like any business, trademark law 
prevented the registration of marks that are "immoral . . . scandalous 
... or matter which may disparage .. .persons,. . . institutions, beliefs, 
or national symbols" on the federal database ofthe United States Patent 
& Trademark Office.8 While that particular prohibition may now be at 
an end, given the recent decision in In re Tam,9 brewers must still 
contend with alcohol labeling laws at both the state and federal level 
that incorporate similar prohibitions to those imposed by trademark 
law.' 0 
Though the prohibitions were rooted in different areas of law -
alcohol and trademark - the principal and the effect are the same. Now 
that free speech concerns have been implicated in the one, it bears 
examination whether the same analysis can and should be applied to 
6 Todd, Comment to, The GreatBeer Trademark Wars: BrewersHead to the 
Courts to Protect Their Brands, ALL ABOUT BEER MAG. (July 11, 
2017).https://www.beeradvocate.com/community/threads/how-many-different-
beers-are-there.525578/http://allaboutbeer.com/article/beer-trademarks/. Though, 
admittedly, many foreign beers that may not be distributed in the United States are 
listed as well. 
Samantha Drake, CraftBeers Recent Spate ofLawsuits Has Beer Drinkers 
Hopping Mad, QUARTZ (Jan. 13, 2016), http://qz.com/589208/craft-beers-recent-
spate-of-lawsuits-has-beer-drinkers-hopping-mad/; Jonathan Kauffinan, Lagunitas 
Brewing Sues SierraNevada Over IPA Label, INSIDE SCOOP SF GATE (Jan. 13, 2015, 
12:43 PM), http://insidescoopsfsfgate.com/blog/2015/01/13/lagunitas-brewing-
sues-sierra-nevada-over-ipa-label/. 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
9 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
10 See generally id. 
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the other. Accordingly, this piece will briefly examine the structure of 
the trademark law prohibiting registration of obscene marks, the recent 
case law that has struck down that prohibition, and the structure of the 
alcohol labeling laws. The article will conclude with an analysis of 
whether the Tam decision can be applied to the alcohol labeling laws 
and thus open new avenues to the beer branding pundits of the nation. 
II. PROHIBITION OF OBSCENE TRADEMARKS AND IN RE TAM 
In 2011, Simon Shiao Tam, a member of the Asian-American 
dance-rock band "The Slants," sought federal registration for the 
band's name." However, the examining attorney refused the 
application based on a finding that the band name disparaged people 
of Asian descent and was therefore not registrable. The test is two-
pronged: the mark's meaning is (1) likely referring to identifiable 
persons and (2) disparages a substantial composite of the referenced 
group.' 2 The band, itself peopled by individuals of such descent, 
maintained that they were re-appropriating the term for the benefit of 
the Asian community and thus appealed the examining attorney's 
decision.' 3 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the 
original refusal however, based on the aforementioned test and a 
throwaway reference to In re McGinley for the proposition that 
because the band could still call itself "The Slants," the refusal of a 
registered trademark did not implicate speech rights.14 Unperturbed, 
the band appealed again, this time with a First Amendment challenge." 
Sitting judiciary Judge Moore initially confirmed the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board's decision but relied on an en banc hearing for 
a final decision which ultimately held the disparagement provision 
unconstitutional.' 6 The court found the provision to be both content 
and viewpoint discriminatory, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.' 7 
Once under the spotlight of strict scrutiny, the provision was found 
wanting constitutionally since it singled out disparaging speech as a 
II Id. at 1331. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 1358. 
14 See In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313 (citing In re McGinley, 660 
F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
15 See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568-69, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
16 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328. 
17 See id. at 1334-37. 
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subject matter and continued to discriminate based among the 
viewpoints contained therein.' 8 
The court then proceeded to reject the government's various 
defenses including their reliance on In re McGinley, their 
characterization of the provision as a regulation of commercial speech 
subject to lower scrutiny, and their characterization of registration as a 
"subsidy" or "governent speech" outside the bounds of the First 
Amendment.1 9 In doing so, the court found federal registration to 
bestow widely recognized, "truly significant and financially valuable 
benefits upon markholders." 20 The government's denial of those 
benefits, in turn, chilled free speech by "create[ing] a serious 
disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem 
offensive or disparaging." 21 
While the Tam opinion expressly did not touch section 2(a)'s 
prohibitions on immoral or scandalous marks, the holding was 
extended to such soon thereafter in In re Brunetti.2 2 Thus, Tam's 
rationale is currently applicable to all marks submitted to the USPTO 
that would have otherwise been denied based on obscenity grounds. 
This moral breathing room benefits alcohol manufacturers little 
however in the current legal regime. This is because both federal and 
state labeling laws currently prohibit the use of scandalous 
representations, whether through language or pictorial representations, 
on alcohol labels independent of the recently overturned trademark 
law. 
III. PROHIBITION OF OBSCENE ALCOHOL LABELS 
While the trademark laws applicable to alcohol are the same as 
those applied to any other goods or services, federal and state 
governments have both placed labeling regulations upon alcohol that 
control how an alcohol manufacturer may brand and market its 
product. Since the trademark laws are universally applied, the ban on 
registration of scandalous and obscene marks has perhaps been less 
noticeable to alcohol manufacturers since it was a universal 
18 See id. at 1335-37. 
19 Id. at 1333-34, 1337-38, 1345-48. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 22 
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requirement anyhow. If such prohibitions will not be enforced 
universally anymore, the independent labeling laws requiring the same 
become a unique burden to the alcohol industry. It seems fitting then, 
that as the country reevaluates the propriety of such trademark laws on 
a general sense, the same logic might apply to invalidate labeling laws 
prohibiting scandalous marks. 
A. FederalLabelingLaws 
The federal government regulates alcohol labeling through the 
Alcohol & Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau ("TTB").2 3 The TTB 
requires any sealed container of alcoholic beverages that crosses state 
lines to bear an approved label.24 This rule applies to bottles, cans, and 
kegs.2 5 Without an approved label, the alcohol is not allowed to travel 
in interstate commerce - a practice that is not only commonplace, but 
invaluable to an expanding business that hopes to be more than a purely 
regional commodity. 
The labeling laws mandate a variety of information, most of 
which is aimed at keeping potential consumers apprised of factual, 
nutritionally relevant information such as the percentage of alcohol by 
volume, the type of beer, and so on. Specifically, the primarylabel on 
an alcohol container, which would include a keg collar if applicable, is 
required to indicate, among other things, the brand name of the beer. 26 
Though it need not be placed on the primary label, the familiar 
government warning pictured below on the top right of a Modern 
Times Lost Horizon label, must also be displayed on the container and 
in an exceptionally specific format.27 
23 27 C.F.R. § 7 (2016). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at § 7.22. 
27 Id. § 16.20-22 (mandating the inclusion of "GOVERNMENT WARNING: 
(1) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages 
during pregnancy because of the risk ofbirth defects. (2) Consumption ofalcoholic 
beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause 
health problems." on all beer containers). 






- ~ I 
DOUPLE IPA 
U 
This warning must be so designed as to be readily legible "under 
ordinary conditions" and has requirements about background colors 
and the method of affixation.28 
All of this mandated information is akin to that used with other 
foodstuffs however and, again, is aimed at informing consumers about 
the nutritional impact the consumable is likely to have upon them. The 
rules are not aimed at viewpoints however. 29 Where the TTB laws 
begin to tread interesting water is with prohibitions against labels that 
create certain impressions upon potential consumers. These 
prohibitions preclude labels that create a false or misleading 
impression, disparage a competitor's products, simulate government 
approval or involvement, feature unsubstantiated health claims, and 
statements that indicate the beverage is intoxicating.3 0 Many of these 
make intuitive sense to laymen and legal scholars alike. But the TTB 
also prohibits labels that feature obscene or indecent representations. 3 1 
These issues also arise more frequently than one might think. No 
matter how comical or artistic, in order to gain label approval for 
alcoholic beverages, their manufacturers are evidently required to 
avoid sexual innuendos, nudity, expletives, and drug and addiction 
28 Id. 
29 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
30 27 C.F.R. § 7.29. 
Id.§ 7.29(a)(3). 31 
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references. 
But the lin betwen obscenity and art has long been a subjectie 
ightmnre. Objective cr1teria has leter truly beenh pferdb he 
federl ge inent fo what does and does not constitute obscenil 
the molst reliable advice miay well cmne froma Former Supremne Cunrt 
Justice Potter Stewart ilna 1964 cas w henl he said simply. 1 know\ it 
whean I see it ' ' IThel iBH rationale for thc obscene remains simillyl
far from1 wel -Jrticulated andl many have argued its consisency suffers 
for it Tis emates asituation in1 which not1 only is agovernnient ator 
dieciing what is and is n1ot proper decorm, but that decision is also 
lere luck of the draw in terms of which exainer receives the 
appliation. By no means i this a theoretical concern either, when 
obscenity i in the eye of the beholder, inconsistencyis ainevitable as 
evidented by the below apprvals and rejections. 
___ A 1royed ___ Rejected 
3LSc ge y JaiObells v (hio ,7 US 184 (1U.S (hoding the ls 
Mlile him /ie /eets was not obscene and thus was onstutlinily protected by
the Fist \Anendme 0 nttaby the majority was unabl It gee upon a raioenale for 
obscemty and ielded four diffeent opanons from the majority and two dissenng
oHinions, none of whicth had the suppot of l mo than Iwo justs) 
For brewres, the see making the iall on hlfi of the federal gemnnent 
was a single man for well ver a decade, Mr. Kent "bttlle" Matin, vs hird by the 
'1113 in 20)4 and until his retirement in 2015 \1r Mar tin revewed every single mali 
beverage Iabel applicanion submited to the Ilfi tbr label .pprm'al. 
or n' P/?1VIE/ / / (HOHBSENITY20151Till I 10 107 
Approved Rejected 
More impotanly . at first blush. the TFB's prohibition on the 
obscene is similar in both source (fedl government) and efect 
(denied benfits based on use of a mark that is deemed obscene)as 
those recenth helI unconstitutional by lam and lieta The court in 
Tam expresly limited its hokdng to the disparagment provision of 
the I anham Act but anticpated the applicability elsewhere when it 
[recogniv[cd] . that other portions of §2 may likewlise constitute 
government egulation of expresion based on message, such as the 
elusions of the imnmoral and scandalous nukt.I|' Taking their 
argnument on its mintthe FlB ban on indecent and obsene labels also 
cnstitutes "govenment regulation of expression based on 
message " Adktionally, it the sam mnesage bein regulated 
that of the obscene, sandalous and immoral 
Whtie the USPTO has made cearthat it belies In re Tam 
wrongly decided, even it w\as forced to concede that hlim precludes 
the US. rademark Offie fm refusing registration to any mark that 
l under the interdicts of 2(a), and is al the no likely to cause a 
reversal of. refuisalso ri'tustration to mar ks deemed 'scandalous or 
mmlld '~ 1Thialins with the ederal Circuit stanc i In r bun 
Tarn ~ ~ `08Idat13)iIL 
Letter from Assistant Attorney Gieneral Joshua Salzman, an attorney 
advising the D~irector ofthe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to a clerk for the Court 
ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit in the pending Trademark Office appellate case In 
re Brnetti (C AFC' No. 2015-1109) See generally Bob Cumbow, Govermnent 
Concedes that Recent Federal Circuit Ruling on Regsration of ifsparaging" 
Tradenarks Appliesto "Scandalous and Inmoral" Marks As Wiel, IP LAw TkENos: 
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and follows sound logic. 
The label approval process is analogous to that in the Pre-Tam 
trademark application process in all of its most important aspects. In 
both processes, businesses are required to undergo an approval process 
in order to gain a benefit that is exceptionally beneficial, if not crucial 
to the business's success. In the TTB proceeding, an approved label 
gives the benefit of distribution and sales rights for the company's 
goods in interstate commerce; in the USPTO proceeding, an approved 
trademark application gives the benefit of exclusive use of a given 
mark for the company's goods in interstate commerce. Neither benefit 
is something that the company must have to operate as a business -
trademark registrations are not required to use a given mark, nor do 
breweries have to distribute their goods to others states (in fact many 
breweries have no desire to grow outside of their backyard) - but in 
both cases the benefit grants access to a valuable business practice. In 
both processes, the approval is hinged on a government actor 
determining whether expressive content is obscene. As such, the 
TTB's ban on label approval for obscene and indecent marks is 
essentially identical in source and effect as the ban on registration 
implemented by the USPTO pre-Tam. Assuming the longevity of Tam, 
the labeling process is thus arguably unconstitutional in identical 
fashion. 
B. Differentiatingthe TTB and USPTO 
One possible rationale for differentiating the two processes, and 
thereby validating the ban implemented by the TTB, is an increased 
risk that consumers may infer government involvement or approval of 
alcohol labels than with trademark registrations. 
In Tam, the government suggested the prohibition on obscene 
marks was outside the realm ofconstitutional protection under a theory 
of trademark registration as "government speech."3 7 The Tam court 
rejected this notion however, noting that: 




Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339. 37 
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[T]he government appears to argue that trademark 
registration and the accoutrements of registration -
such as the registrant's right to attach the ®symbol to 
the registered mark, the mark's placement on the 
Principal Register, and the issuance of a certificate of 
registration - amount to government speech. . . This 
argument is meritless. Trademark registration is a 
regulatory activity. These manifestations of 
government registration do not convert the underlying 
speech to government speech.38 
The court laid out several reasons why the government's 
argument failed, and many of these reasons translate to the TTB 
labeling process as well. 39 This is because many elements of the label 
approval process bear resemblance to the trademark registration 
process and thus the Tam holding extends without effort. For example, 
alcohol labels approved by the TTB are maintained on a public 
database much like the public database maintained by the USPTO for 
trademark registrations on the Principal Register. 
But maintenance of a public database was found to be of little 
persuasive value to the Tam court which held that "a registered mark's 
placement on the Principal Register or publication in the PTO's 
Official Gazette does not morph the private expression being registered 
into government expression." 4 0 Rather, the court focused on the fact 
that "[t]here is apparently no government-published book of all 
trademark registrations; instead, the PrincipalRegister is at most an 
internet database hosted on the PTO's website."4 1 Perhaps most 
tellingly, the court recognized that if the presence of 'speech' in a 
government database qualified that language as government speech, 
then the act of any licensing by the government would preclude First 
Amendment protection. 42 Trademarks registered with the USPTO 
38 Id. at 1345 (internal citations omitted). 
39 Id. at 1345-55. 
40 Id. at 1347. 
41 Id. (emphasis added). 
42 See id. at 1347-48 ("Ifbeing listed in a government database or published 
in a list of registrations were enough to convert private speech to government speech, 
nearly every action the government takes-every parade permit granted, every 
property title recorded, every hunting or fishing license issued-would amount to 
government speech. The government could record recipients ofparade permits in an 
110 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. XII 
should have had a stronger claim to government speech than TTB label 
approval, given the issuance of a certificate bearing an official 
government seal. But even accepting that line of thinking, the 
argument still failed because, according to Tam, "[t]he public simply 
does not view these registration certificates as the government's 
expression of its ideas or as the government's endorsement of the 
ideas, inventions, or trademarks of the private speakers to whom they 
are issued."4 3 Put another way, "the public is unlikely to believe that 
a registered trademark designation accompanying a word or logo on a 
product reflects government endorsement" and the same must surely 
be said of alcoholic beverages considering the country's fraught 
history with the products.4 4 
The court repeatedly rejected the government's argument with 
analogies to copyright law, recognizing that if the government's 
argument was to be accepted, then by extension, materials subject to 
copyright registration would also constitute government speech 
immune to constitutional protection - a concept not proffered by any 
party.4 5 This approach does not apply to the labeling laws universally 
however. In refuting the government's position in Tam, the court took 
into account the fact that 
[t]he vast array of private trademarks are not created by 
the government, owned or monopolized by the 
government, sized andformatted by the government, 
immediately understood as performing any government 
function (like unique, visible vehicle identification), 
aligned with the government, or (putting aside any 
specific government secured trademarks) used as a 
platform for government speech. There is simply no 
meaningful basis for finding that consumers associate 
registered private trademarks with the government.... 
The government argues that use ofthe @ symbol, being 
official database or publish them weekly, thus insulating content-based grants of 
these permits from judicial review. Governmental agencies could assign TV and 
radio licenses and states could refuse to license medical doctors with no First 
Amendment oversight by 'registering' these licenses in an online database, or by 
allowing licensees to display a mark by their name"). 
43 Tam, 808 F.3d. at 1348. 
44 Id. at 1347. 
See id. at 1345-46. 45 
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listed in a database of registered marks, and having 
been issued a registration certificate makes trademark 
registration government speech. These incidents of 
registration do not convert private speech into 
government speech. ... Markholders are not even 
requiredto use the 8 symbol on theirgoods. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1111.46 
One could argue, for example, that the TTB's mandated inclusion 
of text titled in bold, capitalized letters "GOVERNMENT 
WARNING," rises above the mere right to include the ®symbol. The 
government warning is not only required per TTB regulations, but the 
government even goes so far as to control the size and format. And 
unlike the optional use of a registration symbol, the aforementioned 
warning could easily be understood as a platform for government 
speech given the heading "GOVERNMENT WARNING." 4 7 
Even here, however, the argument can and should be refuted by 
the TTB's own regulations. In addition to a ban on obscene material, 
the TTB also bans, among other things, any material that simulates 
government approval or involvement.48 By implication, even the TTB 
46 Id. at 1346-47 (emphasis added). 
47 27 C.F.R. §§ 16.20-16.22 (2016). 
48 Id. at § 7.29(b) ("Simulation of Government stamps. No label shall be of 
such design as to resemble or simulate a stamp of the United States Government or 
of any State or foreign government. No label, other than stamps authorized or 
required by the United States Government or any State or foreign government, shall 
state or indicate that the malt beverage contained in the labeled container is brewed, 
made, bottled, packed, labeled, or sold under, or in accordance with, any municipal, 
State, Federal, or foreign government authorization, law, or regulation, unless such 
statement is required or specifically authorized by Federal, State, or municipal, law 
or regulation, or is required or specifically authorized by the laws or regulations of 
the foreign country in which such malt beverages were produced. Ifthe municipal or 
State government permit number is stated upon a label, it shall not be accompanied 
by an additional statement relating thereto, unless required by State law."). See also 
id. § 7.29(d) ("Flags, seals, coats of arms, crests, and other insignia. Labels shall not 
contain, in the brand name or otherwise, any statement, design, device, or pictorial 
representation which the appropriate TTB officer finds relates to, or is capable of 
being construed as relating to, the armed forces of the United States, or the American 
flag, or any emblem, seal, insignia, or decoration associated with such flag or armed 
forces; nor shall any label contain any statement, design, device, or pictorial 
representation of or concerning any flag, seal, coat of arms, crest or other insignia, 
likely to mislead the consumer to believe that the product has been endorsed, made, 
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does not actually presume that the presence of a government warning 
on a label indicates inherently meaningful government approval or 
involvement. Weighing the several factors mentioned by Tam in their 
totality, it would seem that the same conclusion is warranted in 
labeling laws as in trademark law; namely, that the public is unlikely 
to believe a government warning upon an alcohol label reflects 
government endorsement ofthe primary brand or its representations. 
C. State LabelingLaws 
It bears noting that TTB label approval is not required by the TTB 
unless an alcoholic beverage enters interstate commerce and crosses 
state lines.49 Thus, many alcoholic beverages intended purely for 
intrastate use are not subject to TTB review. That does not preclude 
the issue, however, since many states independently mandate TTB 
approval regardless of whether the beverage will leave the state of 
manufacture. Of those states that do not mandate TTB approval, some 
have relatively duplicative laws regarding alcohol labeling regardless, 
while others states are in fact more stringent than the TTB - a problem 
that is inherent when obscenity is within the eye of the beholder. 
The fact remains however, that for breweries situated within a 
state that does not mandate federal label approval and has either no 
intention to package product or no intention to distribute across state 
lines, the process we have been discussing is not necessary to carry on 
business. But this argument also falls prey to Tam. Specifically, in 
Tam, the government argued that the ban on disparaging trademarks 
did not implicate the First Amendment because a trademark 
registration is not required in order to use a mark, and thus it does not 
prohibit speech.5 o But case law has made clear that the First 
Amendment's standards, including those broadly invalidating message 
discrimination, are not so limited because a denial of benefits creates a 
serious disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem 
offensive or disparaging.5' This logic is no less applicable here as 
or used by, or produced for, or under the supervision of, or in accordance with the 
specifications ofthe government, organization, family, or individual with whom such 
flag, seal, coat of arms, crest, or insignia is associated"). 
49 Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2012). 
5o Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339. 
5i See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The threat 
to the First Amendment arises from the imposition of financial burdens that may have 
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alcohol manufacturers are undoubtedly disincentivized from choosing 
marks that may be interpreted by the TTB as obscene, since labels 
bearing such marks will be rejected and incapable of use in interstate 
commerce and possibly even intrastate commerce, depending on the 
state of manufacture. 
Moreover, many, if not most, breweries do have an intent to 
package and distribute product in interstate commerce. So even for 
those states that have created labeling laws not incorporating the TTB 
regulations, the issue remains since any flouting of the labeling laws 
essentially precludes later distribution of a product. This can be a bitter 
trap for artisan manufacturers that did not accurately anticipate their 
own growth. Alcohol manufacturers may gain local fame with a 
particular brand only to find out much later that should they wish to 
enter the national, or even regional scene, some beers would need to 
be rebranded in order to gain the federal approval necessary for out-of-
state distribution. Rebranding is not only a large expense in terms of 
financial investment, but can also have massively detrimental impacts 
on the brand value associated with a beverage. It does a small craft 
brewery little good to gain widespread local fame, enough to achieve 
cult status, and then learn that their ticket to the big show is a flagship 
beer that would have to be re-named and would thus go unrecognized. 
A rebrand can easily negate any value of initial popularity altogether 
and is thus analogous to the chilled trademark speech cited by Tam.)2 
Much like a trademark registration, the ability to distribute a particular 
brand out-of-state "bestows truly significant and financially valuable 
benefits upon" those with approved labels irrespective of the 
opportunity for in-state sales. 53 
Moreover, should a brewery find luck in the TTB label approval 
process and pass the sniff test of federal regulations, individual state 
regulators may yet reject certain labels for being obscene. For 
example, Michigan based Founders Brewing Co. ran into issues when 
the state ofAlabama refused to approve labels for one of the brewery's 
flagship beers, a scotch-style ale lovingly named Dirty Bastard, and a 
specialty release, the barrel-aged Backwoods Bastard despite the 
the effect of influencing or suppressing speech, and whether those burdens take the 
form of taxes or some other form is unimportant"). 
52 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341 (internal citations omitted). 
Id. at 1340. 53 
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brewery's acquisition of TTB label approval.5 4 Somewhat ironically, 
the state of Michigan (who evidently approved of the word "Bastard" 
in Founders' case) initially denied Flying Dog the right to sell its 
Raging Bitch IPA within the state.55 Nor is it purely a problem with 
hops as Alabama drew yet more notoriety in 2004 after rejecting a 
cabernet sauvignon label for CYCLES GLADIATOR made by Hahn 
Family Wines.5 6 The label featured an artistic rendering of a nude 
woman alongside a bicycle. It was found to be a violation of the 
prohibition against "immodest or sensual" posing despite the artistic 
lens.5 7 The woman is seen from the side and most, if not all, other states 
and the TTB had approved the label without issue. Both of the above 
breweries fought the decisions to censor their beer and in fact both 
were eventually allowed to distribute in the states mentioned. 
However, both businesses were forced to expend time and money 
attempting to navigate these vague areas of law and defend what they 
considered to be their constitutional right. 
IV. BAD FROGS AND FLYING DOGS 
As explored above then, the holding of Tam is applicable both in 
its own internal logic and with regards to the rejected defenses 
proffered by the government. As such, one might argue that the holding 
in Tam can be applied in the state and federal labeling laws and the 
prohibitions on obscenity should therefore be struck down as 
unconstitutional. Should such a case be brought, the government may 
well offer, if not different arguments, at least additional defenses 
unique to the alcohol industry. 
Specifically, alcohol's arguably internally dodgy constitutional 
status may well provide a rationale for differentiating the validity of 
obscenity prohibitions in alcohol labeling laws that are otherwise 
54 The applicable ABC rule in Alabama reads: "The ABC Board may exercise 
its discretion to prohibit advertising it considers objectionable." Ala. Alcohol 
Beverage and Control Board Admin. Code r. 20-x-7-.01(b) (2001). 
55 See Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 597 F. App'x. 
342, 345 (6th Cir. 2015). 
56 CYCLES GLADIATOR, Reg. No. 4,032,145. 
5 AlabamaBans Wine with Naked Nymph on Label, NPR, July 30, 2009 5:39 
PM,https://www.npr.org/sections/the two-way/2009/07/ 
alabama bans wine with naked n.html. Report on the rejection letters not publicly 
available. 
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even 
business practices in general. Post-prohibition regulations made clear 
that alcohol licenses are a privilege, not a right.58 The Twenty-first 
Amendment repealing the prohibition instituted by the Eighteenth 
Amendment, did not allow alcohol manufacture and sales so much as 
grant the states the right to allow "transportation or importation . . . or 
possession" thereof.5 9 In fact, states may absolutely prohibit the 
manufacture, transportation, sale, or possession of alcoholic 
beverages.6 0 Thus, it might go without saying that there is no right 
inherent in the use of a particular label since there is no right to partake 
of the underlying industry. States were granted broad discretion over 
its regulation, and even legalization, of intoxicating beverages under 
the police powers "[o]n account of [the] inherent and potential menace 
to public welfare caused by [the] liquor business," and in fact courts 
have recognized that the "police power to regulate and control [the 
alcohol industry] runs broad and deep, much more so than the power 
to curb and direct ordinary business activity." 61 
Even if the rationale of Tam may well be readily translated to the 
federal prohibitions then, one might argue that the states may retain 
verbatim prohibitions under the broad protection of their police 
powers. Essentially, one might argue that the state's exceptionally 
potent police powers over alcohol trump alcohol manufacturer's free 
First Amendment rights. Enter, once again, Raging Bitch IPA. As 
indicated above, Flying Dog filed suit against the Michigan Liquor 
Control Commission when its label for Raging Bitch IPA was rejected 
unconstitutional with regards to the trademark framework or 
58 See Brown Distrib. Co. v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 597 
P.2d 324, 326 (Okla. 1979) (explaining that under the Twenty-first Amendment, state 
"legislature[s] subject to constitutional restrictions, may lawfully grant right to 
engage in traffic of liquor to certain class or classes of persons and withhold it from 
others, and no one may complain because liquor legislation has denied him the 
privilege of engaging in liquor traffic") (emphasis added); see also Cal. Const. art. 
XX § 22 ("Until the Legislature shall otherwise provide, the privilege of keeping, 
buying, selling, serving, and otherwise disposing of alcoholic beverages . .. and the 
privilege of keeping, buying, selling, serving, and otherwise disposing of beers on 
any premises open to the general public shall be licensed and regulated under the 
applicable provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, insofar as the same are 
not inconsistent with the provisions hereof'). 
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
60 See Francis v. Fitzpatrick, 129 Conn. 619 (1943). 
61 Ruppert v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 138 Conn. 669, 674 (1952) (citing 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887)). 
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for containing "language deemed detrimental to the health, safety, or 
welfare of the general public." 62 Flying Dog maintained that rejection 
of its label for such purposes was, much like in Tam, a violation of its 
First Amendment free speech rights. 
Initially, the district court hearing Flying Dog's case upheld the 
label's rejection. 63 But, undeterred, Flying Dog appealed, and in March 
2015, the 6 th Circuit Court of Appeals sided with beer. 64 Specifically, 
the Flying Dog court cited the Supreme Court's application of the 
CentralHudson test in a case banning inclusion of alcohol content on 
beer labels. 65 In that case, Rubin v. CoorsBrewingCo., 6 6 the court held 
that the speech was commercial in nature but the ban violated the First 
Amendment by failing to satisfy the analytical framework set forth in 
CentralHudson.67 More importantly, the court also held that "Rubin 
resolved any doubt that First Amendment commercial speech 
principles apply to the content of beer labels." 68 Since Ruben, case law 
has frequently specified that First Amendment protection is not 
negated by the Twenty-First Amendment.69 
Thus, in Flying Dog, the court held that "'although the Twenty-
first Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on 
a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating 
beverages within its borders, the Amendment does not license the 
States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the 
Constitution.' Thus, the Twenty-first Amendment does not "diminish 
the force" of the Supremacy Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or 
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses ofthe First Amendment." 7 0 
62 Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 597 F. App'x. 342, 
346 (6th Cir. 2015). 
63 Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 870 F. 
Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Mich. 2012). 
64 FlyingDog, 597 F. App'x at 343. 
65 FlyingDog, 597 F. App'x at 353. 
66 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
67 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-
65 (1980). 
68 FlyingDog, 597 F. App'x at 354. 
69 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) 
(finding Rihode Island's statutory ban on advertisements displaying accurate 
information about retail prices of alcoholic beverages to be "an abridgement of 
speech protected by the First Amendment" that was "not shielded from constitutional 
scrutiny by the Twenty-first Amendment"). 
70 Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 354 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516 
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In reaching their final holding, the Flying Dog court relied heavily on 
Bad Frog. In Bad FrogBrewery, a district court upheld a rejection of 
the brewery's beer label that showed a frog "giving the finger," only 
to be reversed by the Second Circuit on the constitutional question.7 ' 
The Flying Dog court also cited Bad Frog Brewery for 
"persuasive authority that . . . banning a beer label for vulgarity 
violates the First Amendment" and thus "any reasonable state liquor 
commissioner is on notice that banning a beer label based on its content 
would violate the First Amendment unless the CentralHudson test was 
satisfied." 72 This case law makes clear, that whether alcohol 
manufacture is a privilege or a right, alcohol labels are commercial 
speech subject to CentralHudson scrutiny and, thus, any prohibitions 
on obscene material must pass Central Hudson in order to be 
constitutional. 
While a thorough examination of CentralHudson is outside the 
bounds of this article, a brief inspection indicates that to pass muster, 
we must decide: (1) whether the speech at issue concerns lawful 
activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the asserted government 
interest is substantial; and, if so, (3) whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.73 To the extent 
that all fifty states have legalized the manufacture and sale of alcohol, 
the first criterion is not reasonably within dispute. Rather, controversy 
must hinge on whether a substantial government interest is implicated 
and whether the regulation is both direct and narrow. 
The government actor in Bad Frogis indicative of the usual state 
stance with regard to interest, namely, the state's interest in "protecting 
children from vulgar and profane advertising." 74 While the protection 
of minors from obscene materials has long been deemed a substantial 
interest of the state, 75 blanket bans on obscene alcohol labeling are, as 
(1996)). 
71 Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 91-100, 
102-03 (2d Cir. 1998).
72 Flying Dog, 597 F. App'x at 355. 
73 CentralHudson, 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980). 
74 Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 98. 
75 See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see 
also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[W]e have 
repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 
materials"). 
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reiterated by Flying Dog, neither narrow nor direct enough to 
withstand CentralHudson scrutiny.7 6 Rather, "[defendant's] complete 
statewide ban on the use of Bad Frog's labels lack[ed] a 'reasonable 
fit' with the state's asserted interest in shielding minors from vulgarity, 
and [the defendant] gave inadequate consideration to alternatives to [ ] 
blanket suppression of commercial speech." 77 This relatively well-
settled, if not thoroughly integrated, case law is not touched upon or 
overthrown by the holding in Tam. 
That being said, the law may yet be in flux. Turning to California, 
we find Actmedia and Retail Digital Network. In the 1980s, an 
advertising company leased advertising space on shopping carts at 
grocery stores to alcoholic beverage manufacturers.7 This was found 
to be a violation of the state's alcoholic beverage control act which 
forbid an alcohol manufacturer from paying money or furnishing 
anything of value to a retail licensee, such as a grocery store, for the 
privilege of placing or painting a sign or advertisement in the retailer's 
premises. 7 9 That law is still in effect today because, despite being 
challenged on first amendment grounds, the court in Actmedia found 
that the law passed CentralHudson muster. Specifically, the court held 
that "like other tied-house statutes . . . section 25503(h) is primarily 
designed to prevent or limit a specific evil: the achievement of 
dominance or undue influence by alcoholic beverage manufacturers 
and wholesalers over retail establishments." Protection from this 
"specific evil," much like the protection of children from obscene 
materials, had long been deemed valid as a substantial interest of the 
state - namely, temperance. As the Actmedia court noted, drafters of 
tied-house laws were concerned that a free market of advertising 
alcohol would lead to market consolidation, manufacturer and 
wholesaler dominance over retailers, and thus "incentives for retailers 
to be far more aggressive in encouraging their customers to purchase 
the alcoholic beverages they stocked. They feared that the increased 
76 FlyingDog, 597 F. App'x at 369-71. 
77 Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 101 ("[T]he government may not 'reduce the adult 
population . .. to reading only what is fit for children"') (quoting Bolger v. Youngs 
Drug Products Corp. 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)). 
78 Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1986), implied 
overrulingrecognizedby Retail Digital Network LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 
(9th Cir. 2016) (requiring "heightened judicial scrutiny of content-based restrictions 
on non-misleading commercial speech"). 
79 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25503(h) (West 1997). 
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aggressiveness on the part of retailers, combined with the already 
'overly aggressive marketing techniques' of the large [manufacturers] 
who would pay to advertise in retail outlets . . . would increase 
consumption of alcoholic beverages."so Finally, Actmedia found no 
difficulty in holding that the statute was no more extensive than 
necessary for its purpose since "to the extent that the California 
legislature has determined that point-of-purchase advertising is a direct 
cause of excessive alcohol consumption, limiting that advertising is 
'obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach' 
available." 81 
Actmedia stood in solidarity with labeling regulations for some 
time lending credence to the validity of regulating alcohol advertising 
generally. However, a contender has arisen in this arena as well. Retail 
DigitalNetwork, another advertising company, sought to install video 
display units in off-premise retail locations with the idea of selling 
advertising space to alcohol manufacturers. 8 2 The Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control cited Actmedia though and advised them 
that such would be in violation of the ABC Act. Like its analog 
predecessor, the advertising company sued alleging First Amendment 
violations. 83 The trial court granted summary judgment based on 
Actmedia but, unperturbed, this advertiser sought review in the Ninth 
Circuit arguing that the Supreme Court case of Sorrell V IMS Health, 
Inc. established a new level of scrutiny in commercial speech cases. 
Specifically, Sorrell created "heightened scrutiny" and Actmedia 's 
holding was irreconcilable with it. 8 4 Somewhat surprisingly, the three 
member panel agreed with the advertiser and held that intermediate 
scrutiny in cases such as these have now give way to Sorrell's 
"heightened scrutiny." 85 
In remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit noted the state's "broad 
goal of 'temperance' [] remains 'a valid and important interest of the 
state under the Twenty-first Amendment"' but expressed skepticism 
on whether the content-based burdens of expression regarding point of 
80 Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 966. 
81 Id. at 967 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 
507 (1981)). 
82 See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 645. 
Id. at 653. 85 
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sale advertising directly advanced that goal or did so in a permissible 
fashion.86 One such reason for this skepticism was the "increasing 
number of statutory exceptions to section 25503(f)-(h)" that the state 
has evidently deemed acceptable - a trend that is arguably present with 
regards to obscenity restrictions as well as evidenced by Tam, Raging 
Bitch, and Bad Frog.87 The Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control 
has petitioned for re-hearing of the case en banc, but the big question 
in the interim remains - what exactly does "heightened scrutiny" mean 
for alcohol manufacturers?" Sorrell may well mark the abandonment 
of CentralHudson for commercial speech regulations, and with it 
much of the rationale for labeling regulations prohibiting obscene 
material but the hammer will likely need to fall with regard to pure 
retail advertising first. Only after escaping the puritan values of 
temperance that CentralHudson has long upheld can obscenity hope 
to sneak in the backdoor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Tam does not directly apply to the TTB, but the 
Federal Circuit's ruling - that a government ban on expressive 
content with a particular message is unconstitutional if the ban 
deprives an applicant of a substantial benefit - could. Meanwhile, 
similar state prohibitions, seemingly outside such constraints 
previously, is also under attack. As such, decades worth of case law 
may be ready to give way that could potentially allow alcohol 
manufacturers breathing room in their very crowded marketing efforts. 
Until such time however, alcohol manufacturers must leave the moral 
low-ground on tap and off packaging. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 The court has not yet acted on the petition, but has granted requests from a 
number of parties to appear as amici, including: California Craft Brewers 
Association, National Beer Wholesalers Association, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of 
America, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of California, and California Beer & Beverage 
Distributors. 
